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   1 
Abstract 
We analyze how choosing to use a particular type of instrument for agri-environmental 
payments, when these payments are constrained by the regulatory authority’s budget, implies an 
underlying targeting criterion with respect to costs, benefits, participation, and income, and the 
tradeoffs among these targeting criteria.  The results provide insight into current policy debates. 
 
 
   2 
Instrument Choice and Budget-Constrained Targeting 
In a series of papers, Babcock et al. (1997) and Wu and Babcock (2001) discuss the economic 
impacts, including efficiency losses and program participation implications, of designing policy 
tools to satisfy three forms of targeting rules or criteria: (a) cost targeting, (b) benefit targeting, 
and (c) cost-benefit targeting.  They analyzed these criteria in the context of land use choices – 
that is, enrolling particular acres of land into a conservation program (e.g., the Conservation 
Reserve Program) on the basis of the costs and/or benefits of doing so – and found that the 
distribution of land characteristics (e.g., the variability of and correlation between costs and 
benefits from land retirement) and also market characteristics (e.g., demand elasticities) affected 
the efficiency loss associated with targeting on the basis of only costs or only benefits.  The 
implicit assumption throughout was that the instruments being used were unrestricted – that the 
policy makers had a perfect ability to target on the basis of whatever criterion they preferred. 
In a separate but related literature on second-best policy instruments (which focuses more 
on infra-marginal choices), economists have considered situations in which the regulatory 
agency seeks to maximize an objective function based on a cost-benefit criterion, but where there 
are restrictions on the types of instruments being used.  A first-best outcome is unattainable when 
the restrictions result in a smaller number of instruments than the number of policy concerns 
(Timbergen 1952), so that the externality can only be imperfectly targeted.  Rather, policy 
instruments are considered second-best whenever restrictions are placed upon their design and/or 
upon the available set of instruments in the regulator’s toolbox.  Most often the focus has been 
on the use of uniformly applied instruments in situations where differentiated instruments would 
be more efficient, and/or instruments that imperfectly target the externality (e.g., incentives 
based on only a few of the input choices influencing emissions) (e.g., Helfand and House 1995; 
Larson et al. 1996; Shortle et al. 1998).     3 
The targeting and second-best literatures are related in that the particular choice of 
instrument and its manner of implementation implicitly defines the type of targeting that can 
actually be achieved – even if the explicit objective is one of cost-benefit targeting (Horan, 
Claassen, and Zhang 2003).  The reason is that the restrictions that lead to second-best 
instruments are really just restrictions on a regulator’s ability to target, with different types of 
restrictions implying different types of tradeoffs among the targeting criteria.  In turn, the same 
sorts of factors (e.g., distributions and correlations of costs and benefits across sources) that 
affect the efficiency of a particular targeting criterion affect the efficiency of the second-best 
instruments that are consistent with that criterion. 
In addition to cost and/or benefit targeting, two other targeting criteria deserve mention: 
participation targeting and income targeting, as these criteria often play an important role in 
discussions surrounding actual policy choices, such as agricultural green payment programs like 
the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) or the Conservation Security Program 
(CSP).  Babcock et al. (1997) and Wu and Babcock (2001), in discussing land retirement 
programs, do not discuss participation targeting separately from cost and/or benefit targeting.  
This is because, given a perfect ability of the regulatory authority to target individual parcels of 
land and to pay producers their opportunity cost of enrolling these parcels, cost targeting and 
benefit targeting are each synonymous with participation – a targeted parcel of land implies 
participation.  Moreover, income targeting is not an issue when land is enrolled at its opportunity 
cost, as producers earn no rents from the deal (although landowners could earn more rents 
through increased prices).  But what if restrictions did arise that limited the regulatory authority’s 
ability to perfectly price discriminate?  In that case, there would be implications for the degree to 
which the program was targeted in terms of participation and/or income.  When the authority’s 
budget is also constrained, then the ensuing tradeoffs could also have implications for targeting   4 
costs and benefits.    
In this paper, we explore targeting issues given a budget constraint and second-best 
restrictions on the setting of environmental subsidies.  We find that when there are restrictions 
that limit the regulatory authority’s ability to perfectly price discriminate, then there are 
implications for the degree to which the program can be targeted in terms of participation and/or 
income.  When the authority’s budget is also constrained, then the ensuing tradeoffs also have 
implications for targeting costs and benefits.  The analytical results are explored using a 
numerical model of agricultural nutrient pollution in the corn belt region of the U.S.  
A model of pollution and targeting 
We begin with a simple analytical model of agricultural pollution to investigate the relation 
between instrument choice and targeting when policy makers are faced with a budget constraint.  
For simplicity, we ignore the complexities of price effects for now, although we consider this in 
the  numerical  section  below.    Define  ri(xi)  to  be  the  ith  (iÎW={1,…,n})  farm’s  expected 
emissions (e.g., runoff), which depend on the farm’s vector of input choices, xi.  Farm i’s costs of 
reducing mean emissions are given by ci(ri), with  0 < ¢ i c ,  0 > ¢ ¢ i c .  At the ith producer’s level of 
unregulated  mean  emissions,
0
i r ,  emission  reduction  is  zero  and,  hence, 0 ) (
0 = i i r c .  When 
emissions are reduced, i.e., when 
0
i i r r < , then cost is positive, i.e.,  0 ) ( > i i r c . Suppose each of n 
farms contributes pollution to a body of water such as a lake.  The expected ambient pollution 







w , where  i w  is the expected delivery coefficient 
representing the mean proportion of emissions from farm i that are actually delivered to the lake.  
Within this framework, marginal pollution control costs are represented by  i c¢ and the marginal 
(physical) benefits of pollution control are represented by  i w .     5 
Following Babcock et al. (1997), a cost-targeted approach to pollution control would 
account for farm-level differences in  i c¢ but not in  i w , a benefit-targeted approach would account 
for  farm-level  differences  in  i w   but  not  in  i c¢,  and  a  cost-benefit-targeted  approach  would 
account for farm-level differences in both  i c¢ and  i w .  The final two targeting concepts are 
income targeting and participation targeting.  Income targeting does not account for farm-level 
differences in  i c¢ or  i w .  Rather, the primary goal is a transfer of income to the agricultural 
sector.  Participation targeting, in a broad sense, relates to which producers voluntarily opt into 
the subsidy program. 
Policy design to address a cost-benefit targeted criterion 
Economists generally advocate designing pollution control policies to be cost-benefit targeted.  
Consider  a  cost-benefit  targeting  criterion,  where  subsidies  based  on  reductions  in  mean 
emissions are designed to maximize environmental quality, or alternatively, minimize ambient 
pollution  levels  subject  to  a  cost  constraint.  The  cost  constraint  limits  cost  and,  therefore, 
emission reduction to a level policy makers believe is concomitant with cost. Thus, the cost-
constrained  problem  yields  a  first-best  solution  (at  least  in  the  context  of  the  minimization 
problem being considered, but not necessarily from an efficiency perspective) which serves as a 
base of comparison for the budget constrained models discussed below. Given subsidies of the 
form, } 0 ), ( max{ i i i r r s - , where si is the subsidy rate and  i r is the baseline from which subsidy 
payments are evaluated, the minimization problem is written  
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where T in constraint (2) represents an aggregate cost target,  ) ( i i s r  is defined in constraint (3) to 
be the ith producer’s optimal emissions response to the subsidy rate (i.e., the solution to  i i s c = ¢ -  
in the case of a positive subsidy), and F is the subset of participating producers with complement 
1 - F , i.e.,  = F Ç F W = F È F
- - 1 1   and   , Æ.  Constraint (3) characterizes the producers reaction to 
the subsidy program and states that the policy maker leverage emission reduction only to the 
extent that producers respond to the subsidy program.  Constraint (4) states that producers will 
participate only if their subsidy payments exceed their pollution control costs. Implicitly, F, is an 
endogenous response to this choice. 
  The first-best solution is the set of subsidies at the producer-specific rate  | | / r wi i s =  
(i.e., the imputed value of the marginal impacts of the producer’s mean emissions), where r<0 is 
the shadow value of the cost constraint (2). Full participation is optimal so long as  0 ) (
0 = ¢ i i r c  for 
all producers and abatement is continuously variable. In other words, the first unit of abatement 
is always gained at a very low cost. Thus, it is also necessary to set the baseline levels  i r  large 
enough to ensure participation by all producers.  If  ) 0 ( i c¢  is sufficiently large for each producer, 
ambient pollution is minimized for a given aggregate cost target T if and only if the resulting 
minimized  ambient  pollution  level  is  achieved  at  least  cost,  i.e.,  if  the  condition 
] /[ ] /[
* *
j j i i c c ¢ - = ¢ - w w  "i,j holds.  The differentiated subsidy rates defined above ensure this 
condition holds as long as there is full participation..  To ensure full participation, it is generally 
sufficient (but not necessary) to set 
0
i i r r = , where 
0
i r  is the ith producer’s level of unregulated   7 
mean emissions (i.e., the solution to  0 = ¢ i c ).  In this, the most-often considered case, producers 
are paid a constant rate for each unit of abatement.  This provides them with rents because the 
subsidy rate equals their equilibrium marginal abatement cost, which is greater than their average 
abatement cost.  These rents are not a problem in the cost-constrained problem because policy 
makers care only about the cost of abatement, not about government expenditures. 
In  the  first-best  solution,  differentiated  subsidy  rates  are  required  to  address  the 
externality  and  differentiated  baselines  are  required  for  the  participation  constraint  (since 
participation under this policy is voluntary) (Tinbergen 1952).  Moreover, once participation is 
addressed, then the baseline affects income transfer as the subsidy component  i ir s  represents a 
lump sum payment that is varied by changing the baseline.
1  Therefore, with no constraints on 
how policy instruments can be designed and implemented, we have a cost-benefit targeted policy 
with full participation in which the resulting income distribution can be adjusted.  Hence, each of 
the targeting criteria can be fully addressed. 
A budget constraint 
Agri-environmental programs do not have unlimited funds, so consider what happens when we 
incorporate the following budget constraint  
(5)   B s r r s i i i i £ - ∑
ÎF i
)] ( [  
where B is the available program budget.  Generally, either the cost constraint (2) or the budget 
constraint (5) will bind, but not both. The budget constraint differs from the cost constraint in the 
sense that program expenditure can exceed abatement cost
2. Suppose constraint (5) binds and (2) 
                                                 
1 Baumol and Oates (1998) correctly point out that  i ir s  is not lump sum if it influences the producer’s decision to 
stay in business. 
2 Program budgets may also be influenced by fiscal issues unrelated to agri-environmental payment programs.   8 
is non-binding (so that r=0).  The Lagrangian for this problem is 
(6)   ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
Î Î Ï Î
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where l<0 is the shadow value of the budget constraint and fi£0 is the shadow value of the ith 
producer’s participation constraint.  The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are 
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as well as the constraints defined in (3)-(5).  It is clear that  0 < i f ,  0 > i s , and  0 > i r  must hold 
for  participating  producers.    From  condition  (8),  this  means  that  i f l =   for  participating 
producers, which when combined with conditions (7) and (3) results in the farm-specific rate 
(9)   F Î " = i s i i         | | /
* * l w  
These subsidy rates are analytically equivalent to the first-best rates, although with  | |
* l in the 
denominator as opposed to |r|.  If the budget imposes more of a constraint than does the cost 
constraint, it must be that  | |
* l > |r| so that the budget-constrained subsidy rates are smaller than 
the cost-constrained ones, with subsidy rates being positively related to the size of B. 
Optimally, the budget constraint should be satisfied as an equality – if money is available 
it can be spent to further reduce ambient pollution.  Similarly, the participation constraints should 
optimally bind for participating firms – if not, producers may earn rents that could otherwise be 
available for additional pollution reductions.  From constraint (4), this means that participating 
producers’ baselines are optimally set at the farm-specific level 
(10)  ] / 1 1 [ / ) (
* * * * * *
rci i i i i i i r r s r c r e - = + =    9 
where  ] / ][ / [
* * * * *
i i i i rci r c dc dr = e   is  the  elasticity  of  mean  emissions  with  respect  to  pollution 
control costs, and the superscript (*) indicates that variables are evaluated at their second-best 
values given the budget restriction.  Equation (10) looks very much like an equilibrium condition 
in a monopsonistic factor market, except that prices and quantities are reversed in (10) relative to 
traditional monopsony conditions.  Still, the monopsony interpretation applies.  The regulator is a 
monopsonist  in  the  market  for  pollution  control.    As  such,  it  has  the  ability  to  perfectly 
discriminate among producers to extract all rents from them.  In a conventional monopsony, the 
monopsonist discriminates with respect to price.  In this case, the monopsonist uses quantity (the 
baseline) to discriminate. 
  With no rents accruing to individual farmers, the regulator only pays for the total cost of 
pollution control.  Analogous to the case of a cost constraint, ambient pollution is therefore 
minimized for a given budget B if and only if the resulting minimized ambient pollution level is 
achieved at least cost, i.e., if the condition  ] /[ ] /[
* *
j j i i c c ¢ - = ¢ - w w  "i,j holds.  The differentiated 
subsidy rates in (9) ensure this condition holds as long as there is full participation. 
  Given complete control over all choice variables, the optimal budget-constrained policy 
differs from the first-best policy in two respects:  (i) subsidy rates are lower, which means 
environmental quality is reduced – although the resulting outcome is still cost-benefit targeted, 
and ; (ii) income transfer no longer occurs, as this would come at the expense of environmental 
improvements.   
We now explore the more realistic case in which there are restrictions on the use of 
instruments so that targeting becomes imperfect.  Specifically, the regulatory authority might not 
have flexibility to set baselines as in (10).  Rather, it might be constrained by some exogenous 
rule such as setting baseline emissions at unregulated levels, i.e., 
0
i i r r = , or setting baselines   10 
uniformly for all producers, i.e.,  r r i =  "i.  We begin with the uniform case. 
Constraining baselines to be uniform 
Suppose  the  baseline  levels  were  required  to  be  uniform  across  producers.    The  uniformity 
requirement  could  apply  to  absolute  levels  or  to  percentage  reductions  from  unregulated 
emissions.  The analysis for each case is analogous, and so we focus on absolute levels for 
simplicity, i.e.,  r ri =  "i. 
  First order condition (7) is unchanged by this assumption (except that r is substituted for 
i r .  Condition (8) is affected, however, and intuitively this could have implications for the 
optimal level of participation.  The necessary condition for the choice of baseline is  
(11)  0 = + - =
¶
¶ ∑ ∑
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With a uniform baseline and heterogeneous producers, it will only be possible to ensure zero 
rents  for  one  producer  –  generally,  the  highest  abatement  cost  producer  (the  highest 
) ( '
0
i r c among  the  set F)  at  the  endogenously-chosen  level  r .    Without  loss  we  denote  this 
producer earning zero rents as i=1 or the marginal producer (the other producers earn rents for 
being more efficient abaters).  Hence,  0 = i f  "i¹1 and  0 1 < f .  For producers i¹1, condition (7) 
can be solved for the second-best farm-specific subsidy rates 
(12) 
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where  0 ] / ][ / [
* * * * * * * * > = i i i i sci s c dc ds e  is producer i’s inverse elasticity of abatement costs with 
respect to the subsidy,  0 ] / ][ / [
* * * * * * * * < = i i i i sri s r dr ds e  is producer i’s inverse elasticity of mean 
runoff  with  respect  to  the  subsidy, 
* * * * * * * * * * * * / )] ( ] [ [ i i i i i i r r c r r s I - - =   is  average  rent  paid  to 
producer i, and the superscript (**) indicates that variables are evaluated at their second-best   11 
values given the budget and uniform baseline restrictions.  Producer i’s optimal subsidy rate 
therefore  equals  the  producer’s  imputed  marginal  damages,  minus  terms  that  account  for 
marginal abatement costs and the per unit rent paid to the producer.   
  Unlike the subsidy rates in (9), the subsidies in (12) will not yield a cost-benefit targeted 
outcome because they reflect more than just the benefits of abatement.  Rather, the three right-
hand-side  (RHS)  terms  in  (12)  explicitly  indicate  tradeoffs  between  benefit  targeting,  cost 
targeting,  and  income  targeting.    Specifically,  a  producer  faces  larger  abatement  incentives 
(greater  i s ) when his/her emissions generate greater marginal damages, but the incentives are 
reduced to reflect the budgetary impacts of the subsidy – with larger reductions occurring for 
producers having larger marginal abatement costs and/or for producers receiving larger per unit 
equilibrium rents.  This means that the resulting ambient pollution level will not be achieved at 
the lowest possible abatement cost but rather at least public expenditure, where this expenditure 
includes both costs and rents as a result of the baseline constraint leading to rent transfers.  Note 
that  both  the  baseline  and  budget  constraints  are  required  for  the  cost,  benefit,  and  income 
tradeoffs to emerge because, as indicated above, the tradeoffs do not arise when only one of 
these constraints holds. 
The reason the subsidy reflects multiple tradeoffs is that the subsidy now has to perform 
two tasks – pollution control and budget allocation, and it cannot do both efficiently.  So in this 
sense the subsidy rate in (12) is only second-best.  As described above, economically optimal 
subsidy rates equal the imputed marginal damages created by each source.  But, in the present 
case,  the  baseline  restrictions  reduce  the  ability  of  the  subsidies  to  efficiently  improve 
environmental  quality.    In  consequence,  the  second-best  subsidy  rates  are  modified  by  two 
additional terms that account for the inefficiencies created by the restrictions in terms of the 
budget allocation impacts (i.e., for covering both costs and rents), which reduces the potential for   12 
environmental  improvements.    Additional  terms  typically  arise  for  second-best  incentives  to 
reflect the impact of the incentive on externalities or distortions that the regulator is unable to 
perfectly target in a second-best world (e.g., Baumol and Oates).
3  
If the marginal environmental benefit of a producer’s abatement is small relative to the 
producer’s marginal abatement costs or the rents that the producer would receive as a result of a 
subsidy, then the producer could optimally face a very small or even zero subsidy rate.  Indeed, 
full participation may not be optimal when baselines and the budget are restricted.  But then from 
whom is it efficient to encourage participation?  If we assume that small-scale polluters (i.e., 
small 
0
i r ) have the largest marginal abatement costs (since one unit of abatement represents a 
larger proportionate reduction in mean emissions when 
0
i r  is smaller), then, under a uniform 
baseline, small-scale polluters will require the largest transfer payments to achieve a given level 
of abatement.  Other things being equal, this means that society would do better to encourage 
participation  only  among  larger-scale  polluters  –  potentially  penalizing  those  producers  who 
have undertaken pollution control investments in the past.  Of course, other things are not equal 
as a producer’s marginal environmental benefits of abatement must also be considered.  Still, 
there  may  clearly  be  social  benefits  from  not  encouraging  participation  from  small-scale 
                                                 
3 There is a large economic literature on second-best policy problems.  Lipsey and Lancaster first formalized the 
concept of second-best.  They addressed the optimal design of policies intended to improve economic efficiency in 
particular sectors of the economy in the presence of distortions in one or more others.  The basic result was that 
“first-best” rules (e.g. marginal cost pricing in a particular sector) may not be appropriate if distortions (i.e., prices 
not equal to marginal cost) remain in one or more other sectors.  In the environmental economics literature, the 
classic example is of a monopolist, where two distortions exist: pollution and an inefficient output price.  The 
optimal emissions tax rate will differ from the Pigouvian prescription, as an emissions tax cannot efficiently address 
both distortions.  Rather, the second-best emissions tax in this case reflects both distortions and equals marginal 
damages plus a term that accounts for the impact of the tax on reducing the pre-existing monopoly distortion.  More 
generally, the concept of second-best is applied to situations in which legal, institutional or informational constraints 
on policy makers restrict their choice or design of policy instruments in a way that prevents them from achieving 
first-best allocations (i.e., usually meaning Pareto Optimal) (Mas-Colell et al.; Boadway).  For example, it has been 
demonstrated that when polluting discharges are imperfectly mixed, an optimal emissions tax structure would be 
differentiated to account for the fact that emissions from alternative sources are not perfect substitutes (Baumol and 
Oates).  In such contexts, a restriction requiring uniform tax rates would create second-best problems for the policy 
maker.         13 
polluters, for budgetary reasons.  As we indicate above, the marginal producer in this case would 
not have the largest marginal abatement costs overall – just among the participating set.   




































1 r c r r s = -  (i.e., the marginal producer earns no 
rents) into equation (13), we obtain 
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The marginal producer faces larger abatement incentives when his/her emissions generate greater 
marginal  damages,  but  the  incentives  are  reduced  to  reflect  the  budgetary  impacts  of  other 
producers’ subsidies.  Finally, the optimal uniform baseline is calculated as in (10) to ensure the 
marginal producer earns zero rents:
4 






rc r r e - =         
Assuming the marginal producer does not have the smallest marginal abatement costs overall 
(e.g., the producer is a medium-scale polluter), this baseline could be set at a relatively large 
value.  Smaller-scale polluters would not benefit from the large baseline as long as the subsidy 
rates are adjusted to limit participation. 
                                                 
4 In the case of a uniform proportional reduction in baseline emissions, 
0 0
i i r r d =  (with d<1), the subsidies in (12) 
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rc r r e d - = .   14 
Constraining baselines to historical levels 
Now consider the case where baselines are set at historical levels, i.e., 
0
i i r r = .  In this case, the 
necessary  condition  for  optimization  is  condition  (7);  condition  (8)  is  no  longer  relevant.  
Moreover,  each  producer  who  is  offered  a  positive  subsidy  rate  will  participate,  with  each 
participating producer earning positive rents (due to convex abatement costs); hence,  0 = i f  
"iÎF.  Given these outcomes, the second-best subsidy rates for this case are as defined in (12) – 
even for the marginal producer.  As above, the resulting environmental outcome will not be 
attained at least cost, as tradeoffs arise among cost, benefit, and income targeting due to the 
combination of the budget and baseline constraints.  Participation could also be affected if it is 




We develop a model of corn production and associated nonpoint pollution for that part of the 
central U.S. (often referred to as the Corn Belt) that is a major contributor of nutrient loads to the 
Gulf of Mexico. Specifically, we selected the portion of the ERS farm resource region known as 
the  ‘Heartland’  (see  Farm  Resource  Regions,  Economic  Research  Service,  USDA, 
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib760)  that  coincides  with  USGS  water  resource  regions 
                                                 
5 Another interesting case, which we do not consider here due to our focus on policy restrictions related to the 
baseline as opposed to subsidy rates, is where baseline restrictions are in place and where the regulator is restricted 
to offering uniform subsidies across producers.  Optimal uniform subsidy rates in this case would simply be a 
weighted average of the values defined by (12) (see Shortle et al. 1998 for a somewhat analogous derivation, but for 
the case of no budget constraint or baseline restrictions).  The key difference here, however, is that the regulator 
cannot individually adjust subsidy rates (e.g., to zero) to discourage participation among some producers.  If 
baselines are set to historical levels, there is no way to limit participation and significant rent transfers might reduce 
the potential for environmental gains.  If baselines were set uniformly, then this value could be varied to affect 
participation.  The only way to limit participation in this case is to reduce the baseline.  Somewhat paradoxically, 
this would tend to crowd out large-scale polluters – exactly the opposite of the case where subsidy rates could be 
independently varied.  This is because a large uniform baseline results in substantial rent transfers to small-scale 
producers (possibly for doing nothing!), resulting in a smaller subsidy rate for encouraging environmental 
improvements.   15 
(WRR)  05,  07,  and  10  (see  http://water.usgs.gov/images/regions.gif).    The  Heartland  region 
accounts for a large share of U.S. corn production and for most of the nitrogen that flows into the 
Gulf of Mexico through the Mississippi River, which is believed to contribute to a large zone of 
hypoxic waters off the Gulf Coast (CAST 1999). Developing the model along Water Resource 
Region (WRR) boundaries facilitates the analysis of nutrient runoff and long-range transport that 
is typical of nitrogen. 
Within each of the three USGS water resources regions in our study area, we define four 
land quality (LQ) classes: LQ1. highly productive land (HPL)/non-highly erodible (non-HEL) 
land  (58.2  million  acres),  LQ2.  HPL/HEL  (10.39  million  acres),  LQ3.  non-HPL  /non-HEL 
(21.74 million acres), and LQ4. non-HPL/HEL (10.33 million acres).  Productivity is defined as 
corn yield potential, calculated using a productivity index (Pierce et al.1983) and county average 
corn  yields  available  from  NASS-USDA  (see  Claassen  et  al.  1998  for  more  details).  
Productivity is considered high when the expected corn yield is 120 bushels per acre or higher.  
Erodibility  is  measured  by  the  erodibility  index,  which  is  a  measure  of  the  soil’s  inherent 
propensity  to  erode,  given  local  climatic  conditions,  relative  to  the  soil’s  natural  ability  to 
withstand erosion without long-term productivity damage. Land is considered highly erodible or 
HEL, when the erodibility index is 8 or larger.  Because runoff and erosion are closely related, 
the erodibility index is also a reasonable (and available) proxy for nutrient losses (emissions).   
Our model of corn production and pollution generation is similar to that of Claassen and 
Horan,  but  incorporates  nutrient  transport  and  represents  more  heterogeneity.    We  consider 
aggregate  production  by  groups  of  producers  or  farms,  defined  by  the  three  water  resource 
regions and four land quality types, for a total of 12 regions.  The model therefore captures 
production over a range of climate, soil, and hydrologic conditions.  Denote farm i’s production 
by the concave function  ) ( i i x f , where  i x  is an (m x 1) vector of inputs (jth element  ij x ).  The   16 
price of corn is p, with inverse demand  ) (∑
i
i f p   ( 0 ) ( < ¢ ∑
i
i f p ).  Define  1 i x  to be farm i’s 
allocation of land, supplied according to a regional inverse supply  ) ( 1 1 i i x w  ( 0 ) ( 1 1 > ¢ i i x w ).  All 
other inputs j¹1 are supplied according to an aggregate inverse supply  ) (∑
i
ij j x w  ( 0 > ¢ j w ). 
  Each farm i is a price-taker operating in competitive input and output markets, with 
profits  ∑ - =
j
ij j i i i x w x pf ) ( p .  Pollution control costs would simply be the reduction in profits 
relative  to  unregulated  levels, 
u
i p ,  restricted  on  emissions  and  prices,  i.e., 
} ) ( | {    min ) , , ( i i i i
u
i x i i r x r w p r c
i
£ - = p p ,  where  ) ( i i x r   is  the  relation  between  input  use  and 
emissions.  For ease of exposition, our earlier specification of the cost function did not account 
for prices although in principle they could be important (Claassen and Horan).  We indicate in 
the next section how price effects influence the numerical results. 
Assuming income and substitution effects are small, net social surplus (not including the 
expected economic damages from pollution) is the sum of consumer surplus, firm-quasi rents, 
and the economic surplus to factors of production not supplied at a constant cost to the industry 
(Just et al. 1982).  The social costs of pollution control are therefore 
∑∫ ∑∫ ∫
¹
∑ - - ∑ - =
1













dv v w dv v w dv v p SNB V  
where 
U SNB represents net social surplus in the unregulated, competitive equilibrium.   
We take production to be a two-level, constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology 
(Sato 1967) that exhibits constant returns to scale.  Following prior work (Abler and Shortle 
1992;  Claassen  and  Horan;  Kawagoe  et  al.  1985;  Hayami  and  Ruttan  1985;  Thirtle  1985; 
Binswanger 1974), production is a function of a composite biological input (produced using land   17 
and nutrients) and a composite mechanical input (produced using capital and labor).  Nitrogen is 
more or less a fixed proportion of nutrient applications, and so we refer to nutrients as nitrogen.   
  Inverse  demand  for  corn  is  a  first  order  approximation  of  actual  inverse  demand, 
∑ - =
i
i f p 2 1 a a .  Factor supplies take a constant elasticity form, 
j
i
ij j j x w
h g ) (∑ = , in the case 
of  non-land  inputs,  and 
il
il il il x w
h g =   in  the  case  of  land.    Land  supply  is  specified  at  the 
(aggregate) farm level, while other factors are freely allocated through region-wide markets, 
given the long-run nature of the model.  Elasticities of substitution among inputs in production 
and elasticities of input supply and output demand are set at the mean values used by Claassen 
and Horan (2001).  The rest of the economic model is developed using cost share and production 
share data from the USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) and the USDA 
National Resource Inventory (NRI). 
  Now consider the environmental side of the model.  Corn production creates external 
social  costs  through  the  unintended  generation  of  nonpoint  source  nutrient  emissions.   
Aggregate emissions for a region are defined as  ) (
1 1 1 i i i
il iN i i x x P g r
x x x = , where  i P  is precipitation, 
iN x   is  aggregate  nitrogen  use,  and  il x   is  the  amount  of  land  used  in  corn  production.  
Specification  and  estimation  of  this  model  is  described  in  the  Appendix.    Emissions  are 
increasing in nitrogen use  0 / > ¶ ¶ iN i x r , decreasing in cropland ( 0 / < ¶ ¶ il i x r , i.e., applying the 
same total amount of nitrogen over a larger land base reduces emissions), and increasing in 
precipitation  0 / > ¶ ¶ i i P r . 
Emissions from each region are transported to the Gulf of Mexico, which is the chief area 
of  concern  for  policy  purposes.    The  proportion  of  loads  that  is  delivered  is  modeled  as  a 
constant delivery coefficient, Ti, so that total mean delivered loads are  ∑ =
i
i ir a w . This relation   18 
represents a first-order approximation to the actual transport process, which is thought to be 
reasonable in many cases (Roth and Jury 1993). 
Results 
We investigated three scenarios: (A) non-uniform subsidy rates and non-uniform baselines, (B) 
non-uniform  subsidy  rates  and  uniform  baselines,  and  (C)  non-uniform  subsidy  rates  and 
historical baselines.  In each case, the cost constraint was defined in terms of net social costs, 
which includes reduced consumer surplus and rents to productive factors.  Specifically, net social 
costs  were  constrained  to  a  20%  reduction  in  net  social  surplus  relative  to  the  unregulated, 
competitive outcome.  The budget constraint was set at $600 million, which is in line with recent 
EQIP and CSP budgets, taking into account the size of the study region.   
  The results of the three scenarios are presented in Table 1.  Ambient pollution levels are 
considerably smaller in scenario A than in the other two scenarios, as the budget constraint was 
not binding for scenario A.  The budget constraint was not binding in scenario A due to the 
assumptions of constant returns to scale (CRTS) in production and competitive input and output 
markets.  Producers earn zero profits in the competitive, unregulated equilibrium under CRTS 
and so they face zero opportunity cost of participation.  In other words, producers will participate 
as long as they are offered a positive subsidy rate and a non-negative total subsidy payment.  
And since the subsidy rate provides marginal incentives while the baseline determines degree of 
income transfer, setting the baseline only marginally above the resulting emissions level (i.e., so 
that  ) ( i i i s r r -   is  only  marginally  positive)  ensures  there  will  be  full  participation  and  no 
(significant) income transfer.
6  The result is that the budget constraint is non-binding and hence 
subsidies can be set at levels such that the cost constraint binds.  Hence, all resources are devoted 
                                                 
6 As described above, the baseline provides a lump sum entitlement to participating producers, and in this case the 
entitlement exactly offsets the opportunity cost of emitting that the subsidy rate creates.   19 
to pollution control instead of income transfer and the solution is cost-effective. 
  Now  consider  scenario  B,  which  exhibits  the  second-largest  reduction  in  ambient 
pollution  among  the  three  scenarios.    The  uniform  baseline  in  this  case  results  in  income 
transfers to all but the marginal producers, and subsidy rates are adjusted to account for this 
transfer.    Indeed,  as  Table  1  indicates,  the  correlation  between  subsidy  rates  and  delivery 
coefficients is –0.2 in this case, in stark contrast to the correlation of 1.0 in the cost-effective 
scenario A.  Moreover, the correlation between subsidy rates and the basis for subsidy payments 
(i.e.,  ) ( i i i s r r - , which is larger for a larger degree of income transfer) is –0.47 – meaning that 
subsidy rates are generally larger for producers receiving smaller income transfer. 
  The optimal policy variables by region for scenario B are illustrated in Figure 1.  The 
horizontal axis in each panel is the ratio of the baseline to unregulated emissions levels, 
0 / i r r .  
Ratios greater than unity indicate that the producer, if offered a positive subsidy, would be paid 
even if no abatement was undertaken.  Ratios less than unity indicate that the producer would not 
receive any payments for some initial units of abatement.  Given that the baseline is uniformly 
applied,  the  ratio  provides  information  on  the  scale  of  pollution,  with  smaller  ratios  being 
associated with producers having larger-scale unregulated emissions.  Figure 1a illustrates the 
relation between subsidy rates and the ratio 
0 / i r r .  In Figure 1b, the solid line illustrates the 
relation between the ratio of the baseline to post-subsidy emissions levels,  ) ( / i i s r r , and the ratio 
0 / i r r .  Values on the vertical axis closer to one imply a smaller degree of income transfer, 
provided  a  positive  subsidy  rate  is  offered.    The  dotted  curve  in  Figure  1b  represents  the 
diagonal, although the two axes are not presented in the same scale.  Values above the diagonal 
indicate  that  emissions  have  decreased  relative  to  unregulated  levels,  and  values  below  the 
diagonal indicate an increase in emissions relative to unregulated case.     20 
  Together, Figures 1a and 1b clearly indicate that the largest source of pollution (WRR 
07-LQ1) is generally provided with the largest subsidy rate to encourage the most pollution 
control, but the uniform baseline is set at a level such that minimal payments are made to this 
source.  This leaves a lot of money for encouraging pollution control among other sources – 
primarily other large emitters because their post-subsidy emissions will be closer to the baseline 
level, resulting in fewer income transfers.  In contrast, given that the uniform baseline equals the 
largest polluter’s post-subsidy emissions level, smaller-scale polluters would require larger total 
subsidy payments for a given incentive rate.  The result would be more income transfer and less 
money  available  for  encouraging  abatement  (via  larger  subsidy  rates).    The  smallest-scale 
polluters, which reside in WRR 05, are therefore offered no subsidy and only partial participation 
results – even though these producers generally have the largest delivery coefficients.  Hence, 
targeting is based more on income transfer than on marginal ambient impacts.  
Figure 1b illustrates that post-subsidy emissions levels actually increase among WRR 05 
producers.    This  is  because  of  output  price  effects:    reduced  production  by  other  producers 
increases the output price and encourages WRR 05 producers to produce more corn and hence 
emissions.  Note that some participating producers in WRR 10 also increase their emissions 
relative to unregulated levels.  This is also due to output price effects.  A larger subsidy rate 
could offset these price effects and reduce emissions, but this would come at a higher subsidy 
payment.  But rather than doing this, a lower subsidy rate is applied in order to keep emissions 
from increasing too much, and this frees up money for controlling other sources having larger 
marginal impacts.   
Finally, Table 1 indicates that ambient pollution is reduced the least under Scenario C.  In 
this case, each participating producer will receive an income transfer, and this transfer grows 
quickly  with  the  level  of  abatement  since  increasingly  larger  subsidy  rates  are  required  for   21 
additional units of abatement.  Therefore, encouraging only partial participation, in which only a 
few producers take on enough abatement responsibilities to consume the entire budget, would 
result in large income transfers and possibly small reductions in ambient pollution.  Ambient 
pollution  is  more  effectively  reduced  by  spreading  emissions  controls  among  all  producers, 
thereby  limiting  the  income  transfer  per  producer  while  increasing  aggregate  pollution 
reductions.  At the same time, the subsidies can be better targeted according to environmental 
benefits, as indicated by equation (12) when the degree of income transfer is reduced.  This 
tradeoff is apparent in Table 1, as the correlation between subsidy rates and benefits is positive in 
scenario C, and the correlation between subsidy rates and the payment basis (income transfer) is 
reduced relative to scenario B. 
Concluding remarks 
Our emphasis on the subsidy baseline and budget constraints is particularly relevant to recent and 
ongoing  conservation  policy  debates.    In  U.S.  agri-environmental  policy,  the  Environmental 
Quality  Incentives  Program  (EQIP)  represents  the  traditional  approach  which  employs  a 
historical  baseline:    cost-sharing  for  the  installation  of  adoption  of  new  practices  that  will 
produce additional environmental benefits.  The Conservation Security Program (CSP), created 
by  the  2002  farm  bill,  represents  a  more  generous  baseline  under  which  producers  can  be 
rewarded for past conservation efforts.   Funding for both programs is limited
7.   
We have analyzed the design of subsidies based on abatement and found that setting 
subsidy rates equal to the (imputed) marginal benefits of abatement is not necessarily optimal 
when a budget constraint is introduced and when the regulatory authority is restricted in setting 
                                                 
7 Although first approved as an entitlement program, CSP is now a capped entitlement. 
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the  subsidy  baseline,  which  determines  the  payment  basis.   When  the baseline  is  restricted, 
optimal  subsidy  rates  target  marginal  costs  and  income  transfer  to  producers  in  addition  to 
marginal benefits.  The upshot is that tradeoffs emerge between targeting on the basis of benefits, 
costs, income transfer, and participation.   Numerically, we found that the optimal subsidy rates 
may be less correlated with benefits than with income transfer, depending on the type of baseline 
restriction in place.     23 
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Table 1.  Numerical results 





















100.0  0     
A.  Differentiated 
subsidy  rates  and 
differentiated 
baseline 
22.1  20.0  1.0  0.0 
B.  Differentiated 
subsidy  rates  and 
uniform baseline 
70.4  11.5  -0.2  -0.47 
C.  Differentiated 
subsidy  rates  and 
historical baseline 
83.5  1.4  0.3  -0.14 
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Appendix 
The environmental model is based on the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT). SWAT was 
calibrated using data on climate, soils, land uses, crop allocations, and management practices. 
Next, the SWAT model was run repeatedly using random variations in per acre fertilizer 
application rates and past data on precipitation (see e.g., Helfand and House for a similar 
procedure).  Finally, SWAT output was analyzed to link fertilizer application to runoff per acre.  
The SWAT model is calibrated for 8-digit USGS hydrologic cataloguing units (HUCs). 
Within each HUC, multiple hydrologic response units (HRUs) were specified using 
combinations of the 4 land classes, 4 modeled crops (corn, soybeans, wheat, and hay), and other 
land uses.  Within each HUC, one soil was selected to represent each land class. Using National 
Resources Inventory (NRI) data and the Soils5 data, the soil with the largest cropland acreage for 
each land class within each HUC was selected to represent the land class in that HUC.   
Acreages, by land quality class and land use, are obtained from the 1997 NRI data.  
Acreage of four crops was used:  corn, soybeans, wheat, and hay. The balance of crop acreage 
was generally very small. To avoid unnecessarily complicating the model runs, these acres were 
allocated proportionally to other crops. Non-cropland acres were represented by a single HRU.  
The land use was determined by the predominant non-cropland use in the watershed and could 
be pasture, forest, urban, or wetland.  
Production practices and inputs were specified using ARMS data. Nitrogen application 
rates in corn were specified by calculating average application rates by land type, then testing for 
significant differences among land types.  Application rates where significantly different 
between high and low quality land, but not between highly erodible and non-highly erodible 
land.  Other inputs for corn and other crops were similarly specified.   28 
Once the SWAT model was calibrated to the baseline data, a dataset was created by 
varying per acre nitrogen application rates over repeated model runs. Nitrogen application rates 
range from 80 to 100 percent of the baseline rate.  Historical data on weather was used to 
account for variations in weather conditions that are also important in determining nutrient 
runoff. To “wet” the model, SWAT was run for at least 5 years worth of weather data with 
management variables set to baseline levels. Then management variables were shocked and the 
model was run for the next five years worth of weather data.  
We regressed nitrogen runoff per acre against data on precipitation, nitrogen application, 
and land quality.  While SWAT is a complex system, the goal of this parameterization is to 
develop a single equation describing the relationships between a specific environmental outcome 
and relevant management factors, accounting for land types and climatic conditions. This 
procedure is tantamount to estimating a reduced form equation from a system of structural 
equations.  The runoff function is specified in a log-log form:     
)) 1 )( / ( log( )) 1 )( / ( log( )) / ( log( ) / log( 3 2 1 0 H x x P c E x x P c x x P c c x r il iN i il iN i il iN i il i + + + + + =  
where  il x  is area planted in corn (ha),   il i x r /  is per-acre nitrogen runoff (kg/ha),   i P  is annual 
precipitation (millimeters),   iN x  is total nitrogen application (kg),  E equals one for highly 
erodible land, zero otherwise, H equals on for high productivity land, zero otherwise. 
The model is specified to focus on the interaction between nitrogen application, precipitation, 
and land quality.  Nitrogen application and land quality variables are interacted with precipitation 
given that precipitation drives all nutrient runoff.  Nitrogen runoff per unit of precipitation can 
vary in the context of land quality variations, which represent differences in underlying soils, 
topography and proxy for differences in management variations other than nitrogen application. 
Separate equations were estimated for each Water Resources Region using OLS with 
observations  weighted by corn acreage. 